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Rationing in the Time of COVID and
the Perils of Anti-Subordination
Rhetoric
Mark Kelman*
Abstract
With surges in COVID-19 cases threatening to overload
some hospital facilities, we must face the possibility that
therapeutic treatments will need to be rationed, at least in some
places. I do not propose any particular ideal rationing scheme
but caution strongly against adopting a position that Professor
Bagenstos advocated this past spring, rejecting rationing on the
basis of patient life expectancy simply because life expectancy
based rationing might threaten the factual interests of those with
disabilities and might conceivably be implemented by those
making judgments that were not simply inaccurate but grounded
in biased, unacceptably discriminatory intuitions that some
decision makers would have about the life expectancy of those
with disabilities. My view is that Professor Bagenstos does not
make either considered normative or empirical arguments that
attending to the factual interests of those with disabilities or
protecting
against
the
possibility
of
discriminatory
implementation of a plan should trump all other considerations;
instead, he is “performing” his rhetorical commitment to a
subordinated community as though that commitment functioned
in the same way as a formal, normatively and factually defended
side constraint on action would function.

* James C. Gaither Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Stanford Law
School. The author wishes to thank Barbara Fried and Pam Karlan for helpful
comments. Errors, of course, remain mine.
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As hospitals in different regions once more face a crush of
COVID cases, the possibility of needing to ration ICU care (or
ventilators, or, more plausibly, scarce but promising
therapeutics) that was mooted this past spring in Yale Law
Journal’s online forum1 is arising once again.2 Of course, it
would be ideal if all patients who could benefit from the
treatment that would most likely be maximally efficacious for
that patient could receive it, whether at the hospital nearest
them or by being transported to a less stressed facility, but care
rationing may either be essentially unavoidable (we cannot
move all the patients who overstress a particular facility to a
less overburdened one in a timely fashion) or be seen, by at least
some observers, as ethically justified (because the resources
that would be spent getting a patient maximally efficacious care
might better be devoted to other life-saving projects or social
projects thought more worthy than extending life, or increasing
the low probability of survival in the way it would be extended
or increased for the particular patient).3
Figuring out how best to ration scarce medical care is
enormously difficult, and I have no faith that any scheme one
might propose would be the best one. What I do have faith in is
that the way that Professor Bagenstos approached the problem
in his spring commentary rejecting schemes of the sort that
1. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Gets the Ventilator?
Disability Discrimination in COVID-19 Medical-Rationing Protocols, 130
YALE L.J.F. 1 (2020); Govind Persad, Disability Law and the Case for
Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 YALE L.J.F. 26 (2020).
2. Health officials in Utah predicted in late October that they would
need to ration care within a week if hospitalizations continued to spike, noting
that their protocols suggested allocating care to those more likely to survive
COVID if cared for. See Erin Alberty and Sean P. Means, Utah’s hospitals
prepare to ration care as a record number of coronavirus patients flood their
ICUs, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 25, 2020), https://perma.cc/NMQ9-YSTQ (“With
new coronavirus cases shattering records on a daily basis, Utah’s hospitals are
expected to begin rationing care in a week or two.”). Age might be used as a
proxy for survival likelihood, but there is no suggestion that if two patients
were equally (un)likely to survive COVID, the hospital would allocate care to
the person whose life expectancy was otherwise shorter. See id. (summarizing
the four-step process that Utah health officials will follow if the state needs to
ration ICU resources).
3. A very thoughtful defense of the idea that it is improper to spend
limitless amounts on any particular life-saving venture is made in Barbara H.
Fried, What Does Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem (Or Letting It
Die), 62 PHIL. Q. 505, 509–17 (2012).
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Professor Persad proposed that account for the life expectancy
of patients is a very bad way to approach it.4
Professors Bagenstos and Persad agree on many key points:
one could legally (given each author’s view of current law) and
legitimately (given each author’s preferred normative scheme)
choose to allocate a scarce ventilator (or presumably whatever
scarce resources we now feel are effective in treating the
disease) to X rather than Y if Y would either not benefit at all
from the resource (i.e., the treatment itself would be
inefficacious5) or would die in the very short run regardless of
whether he received the ventilator (i.e., Y is terminally ill).6
They also agree that it would be inappropriate to weigh the
quality of each patient’s remaining life years if we do think that
life expectancy is relevant at all, believing that “able bodied”
decision makers will systematically underestimate the quality

4. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18–20 (explaining the problems
inherent to Professor Persad’s “quantity-of-life” rationing approach).
5. Each author seems to treat inefficacy in a more binary fashion than I
would, but neither is explicit about his view on this issue: it might well be the
case that Y could benefit from the treatment but that the probability that he
would is much lower than the probability that X would. Since Bagenstos seems
to treat rationing decisions based on current efficacy of treatment as
presumptively legitimate, I take him to accept that X has a claim to treatment
if an unprejudiced clinician would determine that it is (significantly?) more
likely that the treatment will succeed for him than for Y.
Bagenstos does not address a related (and important) problem that I
also largely leave aside although I hope readers will see the relevance of some
of the discussion in this essay to this problem: What do we do if we can treat
disabled patients as successfully as we treat non-disabled patients only if we
devote more resources to their treatment so that, under certain circumstances,
treating a single disabled patient might preclude the treatment of two, rather
than one, non-disabled patients? For further discussion, see especially infra
note 35. Persad does address this issue, arguing briefly that hospitals can
justifiably devote resources to a patient who requires fewer resources in order
to make more resources available to others. Persad, supra note 1, at 36–37.
6. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that it may be
permissible to ration “where an individual’s underlying disability makes the
individual unable to benefit from coronavirus treatment—either because that
disability interferes with the treatment itself, or because the underlying
disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of the
treatment’s success in addressing the virus”). Persad believes this sort of
rationing scheme—which he dubs “minimal triage”—is insufficient, but he
does not seem to oppose it. Persad, supra note 1, at 28.
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of life that people with “disabilities” actually experience.7 And
they agree that one cannot use disability status directly to make
7. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4 (“[A] proper interpretation of
the law requires assurances that such imminent-death determinations will be
made based on the best available objective evidence, free from bias against
people with disabilities or devaluation of their lives.”), with Persad, supra note
1, at 30 (“I likewise agree . . . that quality-of-life judgments are likely to
incorporate unjust biases that preclude their use in pandemic triage.”).
Bagenstos has written in the past that non-disabled actors will judge the
quality of life of those with disabilities by reference to their aversion to
becoming disabled. See Samuel R. Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger, Hedonic
Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 769
(2007) (explaining that people without disabilities “tend to believe that
disability inevitably has a very negative effect on the enjoyment and quality
of one’s life”). These ex ante preferences to avoid disability, though, unduly
ignore hedonic adaptation—the tendency that people have to return to the
same mildly positive hedonic state after either good events, which improve
one’s overall hedonic state less than people expect, or bad ones, which have
fewer negative hedonic consequences than people anticipate. Id. at 761–69
(summarizing the existing literature that establishes that people with
disabilities experience a higher-than-expected level of happiness). Because
those without disabilities improperly assess the quality of life enjoyed by those
who are disabled (and because treating becoming disabled as “tragic”
reinforces destructive views that disability is a problem that inheres in the
disabled individual rather than the failure of the community generally to
accommodate those with different abilities), jurors should be forbidden to
award hedonic damages to those who have suffered disabling injuries. Id. at
797 (“Incorporating the views of people without disabilities in the law distracts
attention from the social choices that attach disadvantage to disability, and it
may itself inflict hedonic harm on people with disabilities.”).
I agree with both Professors Bagenstos and Persad that rationing
COVID treatment resources by reference to QALY (quality adjusted life years)
is problematic. I do so in part because the actual experiences of people with
disabilities will likely not be properly heard and accounted for by those
bureaucrats charged with measuring the quality of experience and in part
because I am not convinced that anything that any single one of us (or a
collective body made up of people with particular views of what made life of
higher quality) would dub a “higher quality” life (unlike “years of life”) is what
John Rawls would have called a “primary good,” a good that anyone would
want regardless of her particular aims. (To be alive rather than not
alive — that is, having more life—is something that permits anyone to meet
whatever particular aims she has during the period she is alive. On the other
hand, not everyone will think it is advantageous to have an additional year of
what someone else calls a higher quality life than another year of what you
yourself believe to be a higher quality experience.) See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 92 (1971) (explaining that primary goods are “things which it is
supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants”). Having said that, I
should note that I think that Bagenstos misuses what is itself a quite
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rationing decisions, even if one were doing so believing it was a
proxy for shorter life expectancy (rather than manifesting even
more clearly impermissible animus towards those with
disabilities or dismissal of the value of their lives).8
problematic literature on hedonic adaption in his attack on assessing the
experience of those with disabilities. I briefly explore some of the problems
with the claim in the conventional literature on hedonic adaptation that
becoming disabled does not adversely impact subjectively experienced welfare
levels in Mark Kelman, Hard Choices and Deficient Choosers, 14 NW. J.L. &
SOC. POL’Y 191, 213–20 (2019) and explore the problems at more length in
Mark Kelman, Injuries ch. 3 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). The hedonic adaptation literature is also critiqued in Rick Swedloff &
Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 85 IND. L.J.
553, 564–67 (2010).
8. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 3–4 (arguing that “disability-based
distinctions” in rationing violate the law). Persad also argues that decision
makers are required to make individualized judgments about life expectancy,
rather than relying on (even true) generalizations about the traits of members
of subordinated groups. See Persad, supra note 1, at 31–32 (proposing that
decision makers should employ “medically relevant information” and exclude
irrelevant factors like disability status); id. at 48
[E]vidence-based triage involves individualized determinations, not
categorical denial of treatment to cystic fibrosis patients [a group of
disabled patients that Bagenstos had discussed]. . . . [D]enying
lifesaving treatment to the cystic fibrosis patients whose disability
makes them comparatively unlikely to benefit could save more
patients with cystic fibrosis who are nevertheless likely to benefit.
This outcome is achievable under evidence-based triage, which
considers individualized evidence about benefit . . . .
Early on in employment discrimination law, employers were quite
appropriately forbidden to rely on true generalizations about the job-relevant
traits of members of the plaintiff class when they could instead make more
individualized assessments: thus, for instance, the fact that women as a group
might possess less of the upper body strength relevant to a particular job did
not permit them to refuse to hire women, rather than administer strength
tests to each applicant. See, e.g., Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228,
235–36 (5th Cir. 1969) (rejecting the employer’s argument that the court
should assume “on the basis of a ‘stereotyped characterization’ that few or no
women can safely lift 30 pounds, while all men are treated as if they can”);
Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co., 583 F.2d 275, 280–81 (6th Cir. 1978)
Even a bona fide lifting requirement cannot be implemented by the
blanket exclusion of all females. Rather, it may be implemented
only by a valid test measuring strength directly. Regardless of the
difficulty of measuring individual characteristics, Title VII
prohibits the use of popular stereotypes or even statistical data to
“attribute general group characteristics to each individual member
of the group.” (citations omitted).
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Bagenstos hints, albeit rather vaguely, at an additional
argument that I believe Persad would reject. He believes it
might well be ethically (and legally?) required to reject any
explicit rationing scheme (and move to a lottery system which is
somehow viewed as something other than explicit or
reason-based rationing?) because the observed shortages of
medical resources (and the concomitant need for rationing) were
generated through a political process in which people with
disabilities have less political power than they would have in a
system in which political power were appropriately distributed.9
Alternatively, Bagenstos might merely be claiming that one
reason we should be especially wary of any rationing scheme
which harms the interests of people with disabilities is that they
were underrepresented in the political decision making process,
both in selecting a rationing scheme and in establishing health
care systems that determine the need for rationing.10
What makes this case a bit more difficult is that it is not clear that there are
any reasonable individualized predictors of life expectancy that do not rely on,
or at least account for, disability status. More generally, life expectancy, unlike
lifting strength, can never be simply be currently observed: it is inevitably a
prediction based on other observable facts. And to follow up on Persad’s
example, it is unlikely that we would conclude that a particular patient who
has cystic fibrosis has an atypically short life expectancy without attending to
and accounting for the fact that he has cystic fibrosis.
9. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining the questionable
legitimacy of a rationing process that “place[s] the burden of resource scarcity
on disabled individuals – the very individuals who are most likely to have been
excluded from such decisions”); see also id. at 13
The perceived need to deny ventilators to coronavirus patients with
pre-existing disabilities results not from scarcity as a natural fact,
but from two societal decisions: first, the decision to fail to maintain
an adequate stock of ventilators to serve all patients who would
need them if a pandemic breaks out; second, the decision, once a
pandemic breaks out, to use patients’ pre-existing disabilities as a
basis for denying them the use of those devices. A process in which
people with disabilities were equally represented vis-à-vis the
nondisabled, and in which the interests of both groups were given
equal concern, would not lead to both of these decisions. An equal
process might instead have chosen to obviate the second decision by
maintaining a sufficient stock of ventilators to serve every patient
in the event of a pandemic.
10. It is not as clear as would be ideal what Bagenstos means when he
claims that people with disabilities (all? a particular subset?) lack appropriate
political power in recent years. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 10 (“People
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The (possible) claim that all political decisions are legally
impermissible, full stop, if they adversely affect a group that had
too little power in making the decision or, even more broadly, in
making decisions that impacted the perceived need to make the
particular decision is breathtaking, and not in the good sense. I
take it as given that Blacks as a group are adversely impacted
by many state legislative decisions setting criminal penalty
levels, and that they neither have adequate influence over these
particular decisions nor decisions, e.g., about how to allocate
educational funds, that doubtless indirectly impact the
perceived need for harsh criminal penalties by creating
conditions in which, say, more people of color have reduced
non-criminal economic opportunities.11 It is one thing to say that
the democratic provenance of a state action is relevant in
assessing its legitimacy and quite another to adopt a lexical,
non-compensatory scheme12 in which the recognition that a
with disabilities have faced a long history of exclusion from democratic
participation.”). I assume he might be echoing conventional concerns that they
have less power than their numbers would suggest they should have because
they find it atypically difficult to form coalitions with others or that others
attend less to their interests than they would attend to the interests of
non-disabled fellow citizens. See id. (characterizing the lack of political power
as “exclusion [that] has resulted from an accumulation of decisions that made
it impossible for many disabled people to have access to the political process”).
I will take it as true for argument’s sake that the disabled community still
lacks “appropriate” levels of political power, though I am not sure this is really
true: GOP members of Congress who have tended to be generally restrictive
in enacting both civil rights-protective measures and regulatory measures
(like accommodation requirements) that mandate costly business practices
nonetheless voted overwhelmingly for the Americans with Disabilities Act,
though they have been much more prone than Democrats in the past two
decades to seek to roll ADA protections back. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Would
Republicans Support the Americans with Disabilities Act Today?, NEW
REPUBLIC (July 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/9BMM-CNX8 (explaining that ADA
was a “point of extraordinary consensus” at the time of enactment but that it
“could fail in Congress[] if it were introduced as new legislation today”).
11. See David A. Lieb, Divided America: Minorities Missing in Many
Legislatures, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y86E-PX2K
(describing minority underrepresentation in state legislatures and its
“real-life consequences” across a variety of issues).
12. The easiest way to think about what a lexical decision-making scheme
entails is to consider how we compare the size of two numbers: when judging
whether one number is larger than another, we make the decision lexically. If
number N has more thousands, the fact that another number N has more
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political outcome might have been different had all
subordinated groups been adequately empowered ends all
further inquiry into the permissibility of the outcome. Adequate,
fulsome representation has, quite justifiably, never been treated
as something akin to a side-constraint on legitimate policy
formation.
Throughout this piece, I emphasize the ways in which
Bagenstos uses various undefended non-compensatory/lexical
or side-constraint schemes. My claim is that he does not really
argue that lexical views are appropriate in this case; instead, he
“performs” some imprecisely-defined “support for the
subordinated” as a quasi-lexical trump,13 and this
hundreds or tens or ones is of no moment. (4,123 is larger than 3,999 because
4 > 3!). Domination along one dimension obviates the need to consider further
factors.
Decision-making
schemes
are
conventionally
dubbed
non-compensatory when it is the case that the presence of a good feature or
several defined good features cannot be outweighed or compensated for by the
presence of bad features (or that the presence of a bad feature or features
cannot be compensated for by the presence of good features). For a discussion
of non-compensatory cognitive processes, generally, skeptical of the
descriptive claim made by some psychologists that people in fact make both
judgments of fact and decisions about what option best serves their interests
in a non-compensatory way, see MARK KELMAN, THE HEURISTICS DEBATE 8, 66,
104–12, 121–24, 172–74 (2011).
13. I leave aside several important issues as well as a more trivial one. If
one decides that one can resolve any dispute by “siding with the subordinated,”
one certainly need not believe that in each dyadic dispute the representative
of the more subordinated community must prevail: no one as far as I know
thinks that a Black defendant in a lawsuit should inevitably prevail by virtue
of his subordination against a straight white male plaintiff without regard to
further facts about the suit. That point seems trivial.
But it is a much harder question to know both how one resolves
disputes in which each side is at least arguably subordinated and yet has
clashing interests: for instance, does this rubric help us when we try to resolve
a dispute over the propriety of disciplining a student with a behavior-affecting
disability who claims that his harassment of his female classmates is a
manifestation of his disability? Do we fix on the disabled student’s
subordinated status or the female student’s? For a discussion of formal law
and local practice protecting, to an uncertain extent, students with disabilities
from being disciplined when they violate behavior codes, see MARK KELMAN &
GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE 60–63, 102–11 (1997). It is also a harder
question whether it is a good thing to make legal rights or quasi-entitlements
turn on painting oneself or one’s group as subordinated: there are plainly
problems worth considering with incentivizing a culture of victimization. See
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non-compensatory scheme improperly displaces a fuller
consideration of the virtues and flaws of distinct policy
proposals.
Persad and Bagenstos most explicitly disagree on one key
point, of course: Persad, but not Bagenstos, believes one could
legitimately choose to give X rather than Y scarce life-saving
resources if her life expectancy were longer, even if the use of
life expectancy-based triage methods would disadvantage Y
owing to her disability in the sense that her life expectancy is
lower because of her disability and could disadvantage people
with disabilities generally if their life expectancies are lower.14
Bagenstos never explicitly argues either that life expectancy is
an irrelevant, impermissible criterion (though he does note that
he does not think there would be universal agreement that it is
relevant)15 or that policies with disparate impact on a protected
group, as the use of the life expectancy criterion would likely
have, are invalid per se, even if group membership is
statistically associated with a relevant criterion.
But it is genuinely hard to tell what Bagenstos is claiming
here. There is, of course, no version of disparate impact law that
holds a practice invalid simply because members of a protected
group receive fewer benefits or bear more costs than they would
if the practice were not used: we always ask whether the
practice is justified, whether it meets a legitimate end.16
MARK KELMAN, WHAT IS IN A NAME? 72–88 (2019) (discussing claims made by
religiously observant parties to be exempt from secular laws designed to,
among other goals, decrease discrimination and by politically progressive
students to coach demands to change the ideological content of their courses
in antidiscrimination language).
14. Compare Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18–20 (criticizing Professor
Persad’s use of “quantity-of-life” rationing criteria), with Persad, supra note 1,
at 39 (explaining that “the law permits evidence-based medical judgments[,]”
which includes “consideration of disabilities that limit lifespan,” “even when
[those judgments] disadvantage patients with certain disabilities”).
15. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 17 (“Society does not, of course,
universally endorse expected number of years of survival as a basis for
discrimination in the provision of life-saving treatment.”).
16. Naturally, both burdens of production and proof might be allocated in
different ways, and the allocation of these burdens might impact the likelihood
that a party who wishes to use a practice with disparate impact would in fact
be able to sustain the claim that the practice is indeed acceptable. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (permitting employment discrimination when it
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Occupational qualifications might exclude members of a
protected group at high rates if members of the group typically
lacked such qualifications but would nonetheless be permissible
if they are correlated with actual on-the-job performance.17
Similarly, plaintiffs’ attorneys attacking, say, discrimination in
the administration of the death penalty do not merely ask
whether Black defendants are sentenced to death at higher
rates than non-Black defendants but ask whether they are
sentenced at higher rates when they do not differ along
dimensions relevant to sentencing.18 If I am right that
Bagenstos does accept that significant differences in the
probability that treatment will be efficacious are legitimate
bases for allocating treatment, then he too accepts that people
constitutes “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise”).
17. The canonical statements come from the first Title VII case
expounding the disparate impact theory:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes [sic] cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . . Nothing in the Act
precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures; obviously
they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these
devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are
demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431, 436 (1971). Bagenstos of course
acknowledges this basic conceptual point in his essay, both in discussing job
qualifications and qualifications for receiving medical care. See Bagenstos,
supra note 1, at 8
To be sure, an individual’s disability may make it impossible or
impracticable for them to satisfy certain eligibility criteria, even if
the criteria are defined with no reference to disability. For example,
a state may legitimately demand that bus drivers operate their
vehicles safely; with current technology, blindness is simply
inconsistent with that requirement. Safe operation of motor
vehicles is an interest that can be defined without any reference to
disability. The recognition that some disabilities, given the current
state of technology, are simply incompatible with that interest
reflects a simple and uncontroversial empirical judgment.
18. For a description of such a study, used in litigation challenging the
death penalty in Connecticut, see generally John J. Donohue III, An Empirical
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There
Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 637 (2014).
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with disabilities might legitimately be disadvantaged by COVID
care rationing schemes. For instance, people with Down
Syndrome are ten times more likely to die from COVID: while
the data does not yet fully clarify the extent to which the higher
incidence is a result of a greater risk of contracting COVID or
greater risk of dying from it, the latter appears to be a
significant factor.19
And it is not clear at all what traction Bagenstos thinks he
gets from noting that there is no universal agreement that
allocating scarce resources to those likely to live longest is the
best rationing scheme.20 There is no universal agreement that
longer prison terms, which disproportionately impact a
protected group, are ideal policy either, but we obviously do not
characterize all controversial practices with adverse impact as
impermissibly discriminatory, even if we might believe it
appropriate in evaluating a policy that it did not enjoy universal
support (a minus) and had disparate impact (a clear minus as
well).
The question of when (if ever) it is appropriate to treat the
violation of an interest—whether an individual’s “right” or a
group’s interest in equality or greater degrees of social inclusion
or the commitment to the use of a particular decision-making
procedure—as obviating the need to analyze the fuller range of
consequences that will result if the interest is violated is
obviously a hugely charged political issue. One of many versions
of the battle between deontologists and utilitarian
consequentialists concerns the propriety of harming one
individual to benefit others when the harm to that individual is
(arguably) impermissible given some robust theory of inviolable
side-constraining rights: we typically teach people about such
controversies by asking them to consider whether it is
permissible to convict a person one knows is innocent if the
effects of the conviction (e.g., in deterring future crimes) are
adequately propitious, or whether one can shoot an innocent
19. See Mary Van Beusekom, Down Syndrome Tied to 10 Times the Risk
of COVID-19 Death, U. MINN. CTR. FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE RSCH. & POL’Y (Oct.
22, 2020), https://perma.cc/8YHQ-L2ZM (assessing whether the “the abnormal
immune responses, congenital heart disease, and lung abnormalities common
in people who have the syndrome could be risk factors for severe COVID-19
illness”).
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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person at the command of a madman who credibly threatens to
kill five other innocents if one doesn’t,21 or whether it is
justifiable to push some mythical Fat Man to his death on a
mythical Trolley track when that mythical Fat Man would block
the out-of-control Trolley from running over and killing five
people somehow stuck on the track.22 And, of course, among
those who believe that there are certain things we should never
do regardless of the beneficial consequences, there are
disagreements about which side-constraints bind our actions.23
Mainstream libertarians, of course, believe that redistributive
taxation designed to fund transfer programs to aid the poor
breaches what should be inviolable side-constraining ownership
rights while others believe that such governmentally-compelled
transfers are morally obligatory.24 There are also frequent
disputes about whether interests that we generally treat as
side-constraints are truly absolute or are overridden in some
circumstances. For example, does the ordinary “right” to be free
from trespass dissipate when the trespass is “necessary” (and
what kinds of necessity—health and safety only? property
damage?—and level of necessity—how much property
damage?—are adequate?).25 When we say that an employment

21. See Tim Stelzig, Deontology, Governmental Action, and the
Distributive Exemption: How the Trolley Problem Shapes the Relationship
Between Rights and Policy, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 904–05 (1998); Bernard
Williams, A Critque of Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75,
97–99 (J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973) (offering these
scenarios).
22. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Comment, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE
L.J. 1395, 1409 (1984) (describing the “Fat Man” case).
23. See Stelzig, supra note 21, at 901–03 (concluding that torture of a
child is morally impermissible regardless of any public good that may come of
it).
24. See Daniel Markovits, Essay, How Much Redistribution Should There
Be, 112 YALE L.J. 2291, 2325 (2003) (describing the philosophical
disagreement between pro-redistribution egalitarianism and the libertarian
thinking that redistributive taxation “enslaves the talented”).
25. For an argument that current law is unduly restrictive in prohibiting
trespass, which should be thought of as justified or adequately necessary in
more circumstances than it is today, see generally Ben Depoorter, Fair
Trespass, 111 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1090 (2011). For his brief discussion of the
limited scope of formal necessity doctrine in existing law, see id. at 1100. For
his claim that even exiting law permits trespass to occur even in situations in
which it does not invoke formal necessity doctrine, see id. at 1101–09.
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practice with disparate impact is justified by “business
necessity,” do we mean that it is justified only if the business
would literally fold if it is prohibited from using the practice or
do we mean that it is justified, if, for instance, the use of the
practice simply increases plant-wide productivity by selecting
more capable workers?26
Once again, it is not clear whether Bagenstos is really
claiming that a practice that disadvantages a socially
subordinated group (in this case, those with disabilities) is
 Per se invalid, without consideration of further facts; or
 That a practice that disadvantages in a particular
“discriminatory” way is invalid (and if so, how we should
define the form of discrimination that is invariably
impermissible); or
 That while it would be permissible to account for other
interests even when one disadvantaged a subordinated
group, in this particular case the interests that Persad
highlights (maximizing the expected life years of the
affected patient population)27 is either intrinsically
illegitimate or just not very weighty; or
 That the possibility that Persad’s rubric will be
administered in a discriminatory fashion (doctors will
underestimate the life expectancy of those with
disabilities) renders it invalid (or should merely be
weighed in judging its validity or in policing more
vigorously how the scheme is implemented);28 or
26. See, e.g., Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in
Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (1996)
(reviewing the issue of “whether the term ‘necessity’ in the business necessity
defense literally requires that the discriminatory practice be essential to the
continued viability of the business, or whether it requires something less”).
27. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
28. When it comes to administering the scheme that he finds
permissible—rationing care to those for whom it will be efficacious—he pretty
clearly thinks we must simply be careful that it is administered properly,
without conscious or unconscious reliance on the false idea that people with
disabilities will be unable to benefit from care that he presumes will exist. See
Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 4
A proper interpretation of the law may permit medical providers to
use disability as a basis for a rationing decision where an
individual’s underlying disability makes the individual unable to
benefit from coronavirus treatment—either because that disability
interferes with the treatment itself, or because the underlying
disability will kill the individual in the very near term regardless of
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 That there is a possibility that past discriminatory acts
have suppressed life expectancy for people with
disabilities and those with disabilities shouldn’t be
“double-penalized” by these discriminatory acts (and
again, whether the possibility of “double penalties”
would render the proposed rubric invalid or simply be a
factor to be weighed in evaluating the proposal).29

There are interesting discussions to be had about each
and every one of these issues. For instance, my own sense is that
if one were to argue that “discriminatory” acts are
impermissible, per se, without regard to any putative legitimate
gains one realizes if one takes them, the definition of
discriminatory would have to be narrowed significantly to avoid
unacceptable outcomes carefully. It is not my main point here,
by any means, but I should confess that I am skeptical about the
use of non-compensatory decision making across the board, as
anything other than a heuristic30 designed to protect against
errors that may result from the use of a fuller consequentialist
analysis.31 Still, I believe a reasonable case can be made that
the treatment’s success in addressing the virus. But those
circumstances will be narrow. And a proper interpretation of the
law requires assurances that such imminent-death determinations
will be made based on the best available objective evidence, free
from bias against people with disabilities or devaluation of their
lives.
29. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 18
[F]ew would defend rationing ventilators based on a patient’s race
or wealth—even if it would be a good proxy for number of years of
expected survival following treatment. We recognize that race and
wealth are morally arbitrary for these purposes, that minorities
and poor people were disproportionately excluded from the
decisions about how to invest in healthcare, and that requiring
them to forgo life-saving treatment because of their groups’ poor life
expectancy inflicts a kind of double jeopardy. The disability
discrimination laws place disability on a similar plane.
(internal citations omitted).
30. For these purposes, suffice it to say that “people are employing
heuristics whenever they make a judgment or reach a decision without making
use of some information that could be relevant.” See HEURISTICS DEBATE, supra
note 12, at 3.
31. Political theorists generally dubbed “rule utilitarians” (as opposed to
act utilitarians) believe that it is often wise to forego case-by-case analysis of
whether a practice is justified, all things considered, for many reasons (e.g.,
because people can only be expected to learn and obey simple rules that have
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collective policies (like those at stake in the rationing case) that
are sensible only if one discounts (or underweights) the interests
of members of a subordinated group in constructing social
welfare functions might well always be deemed impermissible
as should individual actions that produce gains only because
those taking the actions gain utility from the suffering of those
in the disadvantaged group.32 But I don’t think a case can be
no complex exceptions, because people will find facts in particular cases in an
overly self-interested way, because act-utilitarian schemes that demand that
one always does what has the best overall consequences might be too
demanding for those who would prefer to display partiality towards some and
would be relieved by a rule that permitted them to show partiality, for
instance, to their family members without having to determine whether such
partiality was beneficial, all things considered, in the particular case.) See
Richard B. Miller, Actual Rule Utilitarianism, 106 J. PHIL. 5, 17 (2009)
(explaining that the “essence of Rule Utilitarianism” is that one should not
“evaluate actions in terms of the particular consequences of particular
actions, . . . but rather evaluate[] actions according to the consequences of a
system”); see also id. at 9–11 (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of rule
utilitarianism). Thus, for instance, one might want to say that it is never
justified to lie (or to lie in an official proceeding) or that one must always stop
at a red light. In that sense, the truth-telling and stop-on-red rules undergird
lexical or noncompensatory decision-making. One might believe these
obligations hold even when one believes in the particular case that there are
compensatory virtues to lying or proceeding because one might believe, among
other reasons, that one’s judgments about whether lying or proceeding is
beneficent are too likely to be self-serving or under-informed. See id. at 10–11
(summarizing the harm of individual judgment to the public). For a classic
discussion and defense of rule utilitarianism, see generally RICHARD B.
BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979).
Actually, much of my hesitation about the use of QALYs—see supra
note 5—is grounded in the rule utilitarian belief that even though there might
well be particular cases in which I believe that it would be appropriate to
differentiate the “quality” of two patient’s life years in making rationing
decisions (e.g., X but not Y is in a coma; X but not Y has advanced ALS or
dementia), the use of a no-QALY “heuristic” protects against both serious
errors of under-valuation of the interests of people with less typical physical
and mental abilities and errors that result simply from assuming to an
unwarranted degree that one’s own picture of a better life is universally
shared.
32. In the past, Bagenstos has rejected the idea that it is sensible in the
context of antidiscrimination law to engage in what utilitarian theorists have
called “preference laundering”—refusing to count the gains realized by
satisfying certain bad tastes (like sadistic tastes or, in this case, animus-based
tastes)—but he was, in that context, not really addressing the issue of whether
discriminatory action was per se invalid but the issue of whether there were
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made that Persad’s plan appears sensible only because we have
implicitly (and unacceptably) discounted the interests of
members of the subordinated group or that any social policy that
is less favorable to or inclusive of all disabled people is per se
impermissible. And I don’t believe that any “weaker” version of
what
it
means
to
discriminate
justifies
treating
“non-discrimination” obligations as absolute side-constraints. It
is hard to tell whether Bagenstos agrees with this normative
framework. It is hard to tell what factual and normative claims
lead him to think that Persad’s proposal to account for life
expectancy is not just less than ideal, but illegitimate.
The reason, I think, that it is so hard to pin down what
these claims are is that Bagenstos uses allegiance to the
disability community and concern for that community’s welfare
as a rhetorical trump, not as a formal trump. (I use the term
“formal trump” to mean an inviolable side-constraint, to mean
that acting on that allegiance is the basis of a lexical
decision-making rubric.) Listing all the ways in which people in
the subordinated identity group could be hurt by a contested
practice ends debate, without either detailed normative
discussion of whether the fact of injury really renders the
practice impermissible or a detailed factual discussion of how
serious or prevalent the harms really are.33 He is “performing”
sensible reasons to distinguish “antidiscrimination” and “accommodation”
norms. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 885–89 (2003)
(evaluating the “antidiscrimination” versus “accommodation” distinction). He also
expressed strong hesitations about trying to ascertain when people’s actions reflect
the fact that they discount the interests of others in historically subordinated
groups. Id. at 852–54, 866–67 (expressing skepticism about determining when
discrimination is based on the “intentional devaluing of another’s interests”). It is a
complex question, that I set aside here, whether decisions that are sensible only to
those operating on (certain particular sorts of) stereotypes about members of
subordinated groups should also perhaps be deemed per se unacceptable.
33. Bagenstos suggests (without straightforwardly asserting) that it is
the case that we cannot use even a conceptually valid plan if it is likely to be
used in a discriminatory manner. See Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 20
Persad’s argument depends on the existence of “evidence-based”
assessments of how a pre-existing disability affects life
expectancy—and it depends on the evidence being good. But the
biases I discussed . . . should lead to great skepticism about the
quality of the “evidence” supporting express disability-based
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a lexical decision rubric, grounded in what he rightly sees as the
profound importance of addressing identity-based group
subordination, but neither defending the uses of strict lexical
schemes nor evaluating how the practice he is ostensibly
interrogating would fare if we considered all of the possibly
relevant facts.
A second COVID-related case might be useful in thinking
about what I mean when I describe Bagenstos as “performing”
a lexical decision-making scheme. It is a particularly salient
example for me not only because I think the lexical
decision-making scheme I decry led to the correct bottom-line
decision in the particular case, but because I think I myself used
the very sort of lexical scheme in evaluating the proposals that
I am condemning here, even though I think I am usually
sensitive to rejecting such schemes. Last spring, law schools had
to make a decision as to whether to switch over to mandatory
pass/fail grading. I think all of us I would describe as having
broadly centrist or progressive sympathies made the decision
via this sort of one-stop anti-subordination performativity, in
part because this method has become so routinized in our
political sub-communities. As soon as the argument was made
(correctly) that some students of color and First Gen/Low
Income students would have a harder time with online learning
than more privileged students (given, e.g., distinctions in access
to dependable Internet connections or more demands from
family members more likely to be adversely impacted, both
economically and in health terms, by the pandemic), none of was
willing to consider anything more. There was no empirical
inquiry (how many students from subordinated communities
would face these problems? what steps might the school take to
overcome problems of unequal access to technology? how much
exclusions or deprioritizations in a rationing plan. A key goal of
antidiscrimination laws is to counteract those sorts of biases.
But to reach that conclusion, we need a great deal more normative clarification
than he offers to begin to figure out what level of discriminatory
implementation invalidates a plan. And we also need far more data about the
mistaken life expectancy predictions doctors have made or will make. It is not
enough to say that doctors generically think “people with disabilities” will live
less long than they actually will: many people with disabilities (e.g., certain
cancers, cystic fibrosis) obviously do have a lower life expectancy because of
their disability (and that lower life expectancy is not obviously related across
the board to any past discriminatory mistreatment that they have received).
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harder would school be for them? how much worse was the
disadvantage during the pandemic relative to the advantages of
privilege in ordinary times?) And there was no real effort to
interrogate our own norms either: what are the virtues and
flaws of grading generally? how will employers make decisions
if students have not received grades and will some of the
methods that they use entrench unjustified privilege in ways
that should especially concern those who want to protect
historically subordinated students? what are the virtues and
flaws of reducing the number of grades students received before
they went on the conventional job market? Of course, even from
the perspective of those who reject non-compensatory
decision-making, it was important to weigh the special burdens
the pandemic imposed on already-disadvantaged students in
reaching a decision on the proper course to follow, in the same
way that we ought to attend to distributional concerns in
evaluating policy choices across the board, but my point is that
one almost surely needs to consider more to reach a satisfactory
conclusion.
By using disability rights as a rhetorical trump here,
Bagenstos dismisses Persad’s argument that life expectancy
matters without interrogating or explaining his own beliefs
about that extremely difficult normative question.34 It is
34. Bagenstos does briefly note that there are some reasons to believe
that Persad’s principle might not be compelling—e.g., the fact that one might
prefer to save a thirty-year-old rather than an eighty-year-old might not be
based on comparing their prospective life expectancies but on thinking that
the eighty-year-old has already, retrospectively, lived a full life and the
younger person should be given the chance to do the same. See Bagenstos,
supra note 1, at near footnote 16
Even if we focus on those who do agree that age is an appropriate
criterion, it is far from clear that they hold that position because
they believe health systems should maximize the number of
life-years saved. Many people defend the use of age based on
grounds that are backward rather than forward looking—“the
feeling that everyone is entitled to some ‘normal’ span of
health . . . .”
If that is why we should favor the thirty-year-old, though, there is less reason
to differentiate the treatment of two sixty-five-year-old patients based on how
long they might still have to live or to favor a twenty-five-year-old over a
thirty-five-year-old, neither of whom has experienced a “normal life span”
simply because the younger patient is projected to live longer.
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striking that we never see him work through the difficult
normative question or reveal how he resolved it, or whether the
arguments he is relying on resemble arguments that readers
might find appealing (or unpersuasive) in other contexts.35 Nor
Once more, one of the reasons I think it is so difficult to recommend
any particular rationing scheme with an even modest degree of assurance is
that our ethical intuitions in this area are both complex and difficult to defend.
For instance, my own intuition is that certain life expectancy distinctions
should be of little consequence even though they may appear to be of
substantial magnitude. In that sense, I would agree with Bagenstos that we
should not simply seek (as Persad arguably does) to maximize the number of
life years lived by the population. For example, I would not be predisposed to
prioritize fifty-year-old Patient X with a life expectancy of thirty-five years
over Patient Y (perhaps a Type-2 diabetic who smokes) with a life expectancy
of twenty years but would be predisposed to prioritize seventy-year-old Patient
Q with a life expectancy of fifteen years over seventy-year-old Patient R (with
significant congestive heart failure that is not so likely to be imminently fatal
that he would qualify for hospice care) whose life expectancy was between two
and four years, even though this unquestionably harmed the interests of
(disabled) CHF patients. But the collective dialogue that would allow us to
accept or reject my intuitions would hardly be an easy or straightforward one
and would not be advanced by ruling out the possibility of deprioritizing the
CHF patient’s claims unless he faced imminent death, as Bagenstos would.
35. Although my goal here is not to defend the idea that we should use
life expectancy-based rationing schemes, it is important to recognize that
there are many reasons one could offer that make attending to life expectancy
morally acceptable. For instance, people behind a veil of ignorance, not
knowing whether they would be long or short-lived, might well prefer a policy
that maximized life expectancy. Or, from a collective welfarist perspective, the
state of affairs in which a given population lives longer generates higher levels
of aggregate welfare so long as being alive is a positive experience (in hedonic
welfare terms) or preferred (if one looks at this from a preference-utilitarian
viewpoint) and has access to a higher amount of “primary goods.” It is
consistent as well with a desire that I do not find especially compelling to treat
one year of each and every individual’s life as precisely equally valuable.
My tentative intuition is that Bagenstos is (very covertly?) adopting
views similar to those advanced by John Taurek, who argued that a moral
actor would have no more reason to save five drowning people than one if he
could only take one of those acts. See John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers
Count? 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 293, 293–94 (1977) (rejecting the view that one
should act to save the greatest number of people that one can). Taurek’s
argument is one that most experimental subjects clearly reject. See Mark
Kelman & Tamar Admati Kreps, Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the
Permissibility of Aggregation, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 204–05,
217 – 18 (2014) (“[W]e note the consistency with which subjects reject Taurek’s
conclusion that the number of lives lost does not matter”). Taurek’s primary
claim is that we can never sum experiences across persons—X’s death is never
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does he answer the hard question mentioned before: does the
fact that allocating to those with the greatest life expectancy is
not the only acceptable answer to the rationing problem mean
that it is a discriminatory and unacceptable answer to the
problem?
He also does not confront the challenging empirical
questions that are inevitably raised if we take some of his
worries seriously. If it is the case that we should worry about
misestimation of the life expectancy of those with
disabilities—and once again, it would be tremendously helpful
to know if, and if so why, we should not merely consider that a
problem that counts against the proposal or pushes us to work
compensated for by Y’s increased life and to think that it does require believing
that “society” is a moral entity. See Taurek, supra, at 309–10 (questioning the
concept of collective pain and the concomitant existence of a moral duty to save
as many as possible). He further argues that it is inappropriate to attend to
decisions that people would have made ex ante about preferred policies rather
than show them equal regard in whatever position they find themselves ex
post: thus, he says, if there are five folks on a rock to the left of the person with
the lifesaving rowboat that can only make one lifesaving expedition, and just
one on the right, one shows each of the six equal regard only by flipping a coin
to decide whether to go one rock or the other, insuring that each has a 50/50
chance of being saved. See id. at 303 (“Why not give each person an equal
chance to survive? Perhaps I could flip a coin.”). I take it in much the same
way Bagenstos might be drawn to the idea that one only shows equal regard
for low life expectancy people with disabilities and those with longer life
expectancies by giving them an equal chance of receiving treatment, without
regard to the impact on what should be treated as a morally fictional entity,
“social welfare.” But I honestly cannot tell whether Bagenstos would embrace
Taurek’s view or whether he would endorse any of the standard counterclaims
to that claim (e.g., if we treat the person A alone on Rock 1 with the same
regard as we treat person B on Rock 2, we should still go to Rock 2 unless we
are treating people C, D, E, and F with no regard at all in the sense that they
don’t influence our decision; all six could maximize their chance of survival
assuming they don’t know which rock they will end up on if we adopt the “save
more” rule). And my inability to sort through how Bagenstos resolves this
issue reflects what I perceive as an unwillingness to face these thorny
normative questions that is facilitated by adopting the anti-subordination
rhetorical trope. Obviously, Taurek’s argument more directly bears on the
question of whether we might justifiably ration care so that available care
could be given to more patients, favoring using resource R to treat two patients
efficaciously rather than one who required a higher quantity of R. And would,
in Bagenstos’s view, this be permissible even if patients with disabilities more
often required more treatment resources to be treated as efficaciously? Persad
is clear that it is permissible in his view to attend to the quantity of resources
that need to be utilized to save an individual when rationing scarce resources.
Persad, supra note 1, at 36–37.
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harder on program implementation rather than a problem that
invalidates it36—it would help to know how frequently life
expectancy is misestimated and for which types of disabilities.37
If merely asserting the possibility of unwarranted disadvantage
to a subordinated community suffices to cut off further inquiry
into any other goals or factual considerations that might
militate in favor of taking account of remaining life years, then
we will disregard the legitimate interests of people both within
and outside the subordinated community.
Maybe it is appealing, or at least straightforward, to allow
all hard questions to just fly away. We should not take the flight.

36. It is simply not clear in this context whether Bagenstos thinks we
should be dealing with the sorts of balancing issues that compensatory
consequentialists rightly forefront. If there is some measure of misestimation
that is unfair to people with disabilities but ignoring life expectancy across the
board badly misallocates scarce medical resources according to other
compelling criteria, what do we do?
Generally speaking, it is very difficult to determine when it is
appropriate to police discriminatory applications of a practice that we will
nonetheless allow to continue and when we must abolish the practice because
we recognize that there will be discriminatory applications. We might think it
appropriate to abolish the death penalty altogether—even without regard to
one’s general moral attitudes about the death penalty—because it would be
applied in a discriminatory fashion, but not think we would forbid firms from
hiring or firing on anything but a lottery basis because they hire and fire in a
discriminatory fashion. Instead, we should attempt to regulate hiring and
firing so as to diminish discrimination, even if we despair that we will not
completely eliminate it. Plainly, in making those sorts of distinctions, we
consider both the possibility that discriminatory instances of a practice can be
identified and rooted out and the viability of substituting a distinct practice
for the one that might be administered in an unacceptable fashion. We also
consider, of course, both the frequency of discriminatory applications and the
consequences of unjust application to the affected parties. My own view is that
Bagenstos could have made a reasonably persuasive case that the losses from
moving to a system less likely to be administered in a discriminatory fashion
might be relatively low and the consequences of discriminatory application
especially high in this class of cases.
37. Presumably, if we believe that doctors underestimate the life
expectancy for certain sub-groups of disabled people but not for others, we
might want to fix the misestimation problem for those sub-groups rather than
ditch the program altogether.

